Nice Essay

Public opinion polls reveal that racial profiling is a concern to a clear majority of Americans. A recent Gallup poll found that 81 percent of Americans thought racial profiling to be wrong and that 59 percent felt that racial profiling was widespread (Ludwig, 2003). The poll also revealed the expected differences between the perceptions of Whites and African-Americans, a solid majority of White (56 percent), and more than three out of four African-Americans (77 percent) survey respondents indicated that they believed the practice was widespread. Even President George W. Bush has weighed in on the subject. In a 2001 address to a Joint Session of Congress, Bush said: “Racial profiling is wrong, and we will end it in America. In so doing, we will not hinder the work of our Nation’s brave police officers. They protect us every day, often at great risk. But by stopping the abuses of a few, we will add to the public confidence our police officers earn and deserve” (Bush, 2001). Chief Russ Leach of the Riverside California Police Department commented that “The practice of racial profiling has no place in law enforcement. It is an activity that undermines the public trust vital for an effective community policing organization. Police must be perceived as both providers of public safety and deferential to the civil liberties of those that they have sworn to protect and serve. While the majority of police officers serve their communities in a professional and ethical manner, the debate over the reality of racial profiling as a practice in law enforcement is loudest on the side of its existence on a national level” (Leach, 2006).

It is easy to see from reviewing these polls and quotes that many people believe that racial profiling exists and is practiced by some law enforcement officers. As such, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has said that “However prevalent racial profiling actually is, public perceptions implore police executives to address it (IACP, 2006).

The question that I will attempt to answer in this paper is; is racial profiling a widespread problem amongst law enforcement agencies in the United States and if so, what are the ethical implications?Of course, to answer the question about the prevalence of racial profiling, the first challenge is to determine exactly what racial profiling is. While, on its face, this may seem to be a relatively simple task, I found many definitions of racial profiling. It seems that police officers, attorneys, civil rights activists, and the average citizen all have differing opinions of what, exactly, constitutes racial profiling.

Racial profiling initially emerged out of concerns that African-Americans and Hispanics were more likely to be stopped by police and were being treated differently by police during those stops than other citizens. In the 1980s, some interdiction efforts targeted African-American and Hispanic drivers on the presumption that they were more likely to be involved in drug trafficking. Indeed, at the very beginning of my law enforcement career in 1986, I was in a narcotics enforcement unit. While a member of this unit, I received training from reputable instructors who taught us the “profile” of a typical drug currier. One of the indicators of a courier was, in fact, the suspects’ race. However, I think it is important to mention that race, in and of itself, was simply one indicator of many indicators related to drug traffickers. More recently, concerns over racial profiling have extended beyond the African-American and Hispanic race categories. For instance, since the 911 attack on the World Trade Center, Muslims and Arabs For the purpose of this paper, the definition that I will use concerning racial profiling is: “Any police-initiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national origin rather than the behavior of an individual or information that leads the police to a particular individual who has been identified as being, or having been, engaged in criminal activity” (Ramirez, McDevitt, & Farrell, 2000).

Much of the evidence regarding the existence of racial profiling is anecdotal. The most common complaint by members of communities of “color” is that they are being stopped for petty traffic violations such as under-inflated tires, failure to properly signal before switching lanes, vehicle equipment violations, speeding less than 10 miles per hour over the posted speed limit, or having an illegible license plate.flying on aircraft have often been subjected to profiling. Racial profiling initially emerged out of concerns that African-Americans and Hispanics were more likely to be stopped by police and were being treated differently by police during those stops than other citizens. Because this evidence is anecdotal in nature, it is impossible to verify or study the evidence surrounding these individual cases. However, some of these cases of alleged racial profiling have resulted in lawsuits being filed against various police agencies for their discriminatory practices.

One of the earliest of these lawsuits was the case of Wilkins v. Maryland State Police (1993).

The case arose after Maryland State Police (MSP) troopers stopped Mr. Wilkins, who is African-American, as he returned home from a relative’s funeral in a rented Cadillac in May, 1992.

Mr. Wilkins, a Harvard Law School graduate and a public defender in Washington, D.C., was stopped for speeding while driving 60 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone of the interstate. During the stop, Wilkins and other family members traveling with him were forced to stand on the side of the highway in the rain for an extended period of time while troopers and drug-sniffing dogs searched their car. Nothing was found. Wilkins, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, filed suit and received a settlement from the state of Maryland. (Wilkins v Maryland State Police, 1993)One of the most important aspects of the Wilkins case was the fact that part of the case’s settlement details mandated that the MSP conduct an analysis of police searches along I-95 in Maryland. The settlement required that the results of that analysis must be released to the public. The MSP retained Dr. John Lamberth, a professor of psychology at Temple University, to conduct the required analysis. In 1995 and 1996 Lamberth compared the population of people searched and arrested with those violating traffic laws on Maryland highways. He constructed a violator sample using both stationary and rolling surveys of drivers violating the legal speed limit on a selected portion of the interstate. His violator survey indicated that 74.7 percent of speeders were White, while 17.5 percent were Black. (Lamberth, 1999) In contrast, according to MSP data, Blacks constituted 79.2 percent of the drivers searched. Lamberth concluded that the data revealed “dramatic and highly statistically significant disparities between the percentage of Black I-95 motorists legitimately subject to stop by the MSP and the percentage of Black motorists detained and searched by troopers on this roadway.” (Lamberth, 1999)Another case of note occurred in Gloucester County, New Jersey in 1994. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Black drivers were reporting that they were being stopped disproportionately by New Jersey troopers. In response to these complaints, the Gloucester County public defender’s office, while representing Pedro Soto and others, filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained in a series of searches, alleging that the searches were unlawful because they were part of a pattern and practice of racial profiling by New Jersey troopers (State of New Jersey v. Pedro Soto et al. 1996). As part of that litigation, the defendants received traffic-stop and arrest data compiled by the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) in selected locations from 1988 through 1991. Professor Lamberth served as the statistical expert for the defendants and conducted a comparative violator survey to weigh the percentage of Blacks stopped and arrested by New Jersey troopers against a comparative percentage of Blacks who violated traffic laws on New Jersey highways. His analysis found that Blacks comprised 13.5 percent of the New Jersey Turnpike population and 15 percent of the drivers speeding. In contrast, Blacks represented 35 percent of those stopped and 73.2 percent of those arrested (Lamberth, 1999). In other words, in New Jersey, Black drivers were disproportion ally more likely to be stopped and arrested than White drivers. The Superior Court of New Jersey relied on Lamberth’s study in its decision to suppress the evidence seized by New Jersey troopers in 19 consolidated criminal prosecutions and concurred with his opinion that the troopers relied on race in stopping and searching turnpike motorists.

Recent data collection efforts in New Jersey and New York have confirmed the independent findings used in the above-described court cases. In April 1999, the Attorney General of New Jersey issued a report indicating that New Jersey troopers had engaged in racial profiling along the New Jersey Turnpike (Verniero, P., Zoubek, P. 1999). This report tracked the racial breakdowns of traffic-stops between 1997 and 1998. The information indicated that people of color constituted 40.6 percent of the stops made on the turnpike. Although few stops resulted in a search, 77.2 percent of those individuals searched were people of color. An analysis of the productivity of these searches indicated that 10.5 percent of the searches that involved White motorists resulted in an arrest or seizure and that 13.5 percent of the searches involving Black motorists resulted in arrest or seizure. The New Jersey report demonstrated that minority motorists were more likely to be involved in consent searches than non-minority motorists. 80 percent of consent searches involved minority motorists (Verniero, P., Zoubek, P. 1999)In December 1999, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer released the results of an investigation by his office of the “stop and frisk” practices in New York City. It showed that Blacks and Latinos were much more likely to be stopped and searched even when the statistics were adjusted to reflect differing criminal participation rates in some neighborhoods (Flynn, K., 1999).

After reviewing 175,000 incidents in which citizens were stopped by the police during the 15-month period that ended in March 1999, the attorney general found that Blacks were stopped six times more often than Whites, while Latinos were stopped four times more often. Blacks made up 25 percent of the city population but 50 per cent of the people stopped and 67 percent of the people frisked by the New York City Street Crimes Unit (New York Attorney General, New York City Police, 1999)In 2000, Doctors James E. Lange, Mark B. Johnson, and Robert B. Voas conducted two studies in an effort to develop benchmark values with which to compare police stop data (traffic-stops) to assess racial profiling (Lange et al., 2005). Lange et al. felt that some of the prior methods used to measure racial profiling, specifically, measuring the differences between the racial distribution of traffic stops and the racial distribution of individuals residing within the regions, often inaccurately indicate that some racial or ethnic groups are being stopped at a rate disproportionate to their representation in the region. Lange, et al. questioned whether these regional or local population estimates were the appropriate benchmark for comparison and reasoned that a more appropriate benchmark for assessing racial profiling would be to estimate the racial composition of those who exceed the speed limit and compare that to the composition of individuals stopped and cited for that offense. Lange, et al. set out to do an even more comprehensive study than was done by Lamberth in Maryland and New Jersey.

The first of their studies, which they refer to as the tollbooth survey, extended Lamberth’s study in two important ways. First, the survey was conducted along the entire New Jersey Turnpike not a regional section (north, central or south). Second, the survey relied upon self-reports of race and ethnicity, thus eliminating measurement error due to unreliable observations. (Lamberth’s measurement of race and ethnicity involved stationing observers by the side of the road to count the number of cars and the race of the occupants)According to Lange et al., the tollbooth survey used two strategies: one to assess the race and ethnicity of drivers, and the other to create reliable and general population estimates for different sections of the turnpike. Researchers positioned themselves inside tollbooths and had face to face contact with drivers, reducing measurement error particularly for Hispanic drivers. A total vehicle count of all vehicles traveling on the turnpike was also obtained in this manner.

As stated by Lange et al., interviewers contacted 4,656 drivers at the tollbooths and 4,039 (86.8%) agreed to participate. For those who did not agree to participate, the driver’s race/ethnicity and age based upon observation was recorded in the analysis. The researchers believed that if refusals were excluded this would introduce more bias than using interviewer’s estimates.

The data was recorded from four 6-hour time blocks: 4 a.m. – 9:59 a.m.; 10:00 a.m. – 3:59 a.m.; 4 p.m. – 9:59 p.m.; 10 p.m. – 3:59 p.m. This choice of timeframes ensured that rush hours were contained within a single shift. Weekends were defined from Saturday at 4 a.m. – Monday at 3:59 a.m. The field procedure featured researchers at selected turnpike exits and two tollbooths, positioned behind the toll collector. A timing mechanism inside a handheld PC told researchers’ when to contact a vehicle for participation and would select vehicles at random without regard for ethnic or racial identification. After the toll collector had collected the driver’s toll ticket, the surveyor would lean out of the booth, explain the survey, assuring that it would remain confidential and was voluntary, and then give the driver an envelope with a $5 bill inside along with information regarding the survey to include a phone number the driver could call if he or she wanted to learn more about the survey. Participants were asked the following: their age, where they entered the turnpike; their ethnic group (White, Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, American Indian or Other); sex was observable by the surveyor. The vehicle license plate number, state of registry, exit number and time of interview were also recorded. According to Lange et al., researchers obtained data of police stops along the New Jersey Turnpike during May 2000 (time period tollbooth survey was conducted). This data was mandated by a Consent Decree between the State of New Jersey and the United States Department of Justice and included the demographic characteristics of individuals stopped and searched by police. When an officer initiates a car stop, he or she contacts their Communications Division by car radio and gives the dispatcher the following information: description of the stopped car and its occupants (to include the number of occupants), their apparent race and ethnicity and their apparent gender. For the purposes of this study researchers who obtained the data did not distinguish between a moving or non-moving violation and included only stops along the turnpike. The data included 7,559 stops of which 7,296 contained sufficient information to be included in the survey.

Their second study, dubbed the turnpike speed survey, was conducted with the intended purpose of determining whether the racial composition of drivers varied as a function of speed. Speeds were measured by capturing high-resolution photographs of a sample of vehicles on the turnpike. Trained coders examined each photograph to determine the race and ethnicity of the driver, and vehicle speeds were used to determine whether the driver was a speeder or nonspeeder. A total of 38,745 photographs were taken; 21,536 were nonspeeders, and 17,209 were speeders who were defined as those individuals traveling 15 mph or more above the posted speed limit. This was based upon the fact that New Jersey State Troopers would initiate a traffic stop at 15 miles per hour over the posted speed limit.

The turnpike speed survey showed a 68 % case reliability factor based on speed; 96.6 % of the cases have reliable age estimates (45 and younger and older than 45); there was no statistically significant differences in the proportion of Black and White drivers between the tollbooth survey and the turnpike speed survey (Lange et al. 2005). Lange et al., state that there appears to be a uniform race/ethnicity effect across all parts of the turnpike where the speed limit is 65 mph; the average driver is very similar for each racial/ethnic group; Black drivers are stopped more often in 65 mph zones as opposed to 55 mph zones where Whites were more likely to be speeders. The study revealed that Blacks were more likely to be stopped at approximately 77 mph.

The results of the research closely mirrored the results obtained by Lamberth, namely, Black drivers were stopped more often than represented in the population. While Lange et al. took a different approach of measuring the existence of racial profiling than did Lamberth; they too concluded that racial profiling was a reality, at least in New Jersey.

Other researchers have conducted studies that indicate that improper racial profiling is not as prevalent as it may seem. Some scholars, such as Kenneth Arrow, argue that if police are not racially prejudiced, yet still use race as a cue to predict the likelihood of criminality among those they stop, they practice statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973). Their preference is to make successful stops, where success is indexed by obtaining evidence of criminal behavior, and they stop more of given racial or ethnic group because they have found that group more likely to be engaged in criminal behavior. Evidence for statistical discrimination would be the equivalence in the average evidence of guilt across stopped citizens from each identifiable racial or ethnic group. Arrow further argues that officers who are prejudiced against a given racial or ethnic group would be willing to stop a member of that group even if the expected evidence of guilt that might be obtained were lower than that expected from the stop of a member of a different group. Evidence for such preference-based discrimination would be a lower average of evidence of guilt across stopped citizens of the discriminated against group.

Ian Ayres puts forth the argument that the most useful benchmark for assessing the meaning of police practices would reflect the rate at which persons of different races engage in behaviors that legitimately place them at risk for police interventions-traffic violations, crimes, or disorderly activity. While Ayres makes note of the prior research done by Lamberth and others, he feels that their research has a variety of limitations. Ayres thinks that another form of data collection, systematic observation of police, is a more effective and accurate method of determining the extent of racial profiling by patrol police officers across the full range of situations these officers encounter, not just traffic stops. Rather than benchmarking the police practices observed in the field according to estimates of the rates at which citizens of different races engage in at-risk practices for police intervention, Ayres uses the outcomes of these police encounters to make judgments about how race may have entered into the judgments police officers made to exercise their authority to intrude into the citizen’s affairs. Ayres research focuses on the two forms of police intrusion that have proven most problematic for police in sustaining a sense of legitimacy in the public: stops and searches. Ayres research was conducted in Indianapolis, Indiana in 1996 and St. Petersburg, Florida in 1997. Ayres data collection focused on officers assigned to 12 patrol beats in each city. Beat samples were matched as closely as possible according to the degree of socioeconomic distress, measured as the sum of percentages of families with children headed by a single female, the adult population that is unemployed, and the population below 50 percent of the poverty level. Field observers were graduate students and honors undergraduates who had received a semester’s training in systematic observation of the police, plus on-site orientation rides. Researchers accompanied patrol officers assigned to the selected neighborhoods throughout a matched sample of work shifts. Observers noted a large number of features of police-citizen interactions, including characteristics and behavior of the citizens and officers, the nature of the location, and the circumstances surrounding the event. Observers took brief field notes, transcribed them into detailed accounts, and coded them according to a protocol. Approximately 240 hours of observation were conducted with officers assigned to each of the selected neighborhoods. Researchers guaranteed that officers’ identities would not be reported according to the limited protection from legal process afforded by federal statute and case law governing research sponsored by the funding agency.

Observers recorded police contact with approximately 6,500 citizens in Indianapolis and 5,500 citizens in St. Petersburg. Of these, 992 in Indianapolis and 671 in St. Petersburg were coded as persons suspected of a crime or illegal activity that the police elected to stop on their own initiative. In Indianapolis, 698 of 992 officer-initiated stops of citizens (70 percent) were of Black citizens, and only 30 percent were of White citizens. In St. Petersburg the numbers were 381 Black citizens stopped and 290 White citizens, or 57 percent of those stopped were Black. In the Indianapolis neighborhoods, that were the focus of Ayres research, 49 percent of the residents were Black. In St. Petersburg neighborhoods, 37 percent were Black.

The results of Ayres research suggested that police of neither Indianapolis nor St. Petersburg engaged in racially preferential treatment in deciding whom to stop. With regards to police searches, Ayres compared the treatment of Black and White suspects according to the race of the officer, using the logic that the absence of police preferential bias will be demonstrated when officers of the same race as the suspect exhibit the same likelihood of searching the suspect as would an officer of a different race. Ayres found statistically significant evidence of a substantial racial preference, although not in a direction anticipated. Ayres found that Black officers were much less likely to search White suspects than were White officers, and that the difference in search rates of Black suspects between Black and White was statistically indistinguishable. Ayres stated that he found the absence of the expected race effects in both cities to be striking. Ayres concluded that Black citizens do not appear to be the victims of racial profiling in these two cities (Ayres, 2001).

The most recent research, as reported by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics statisticians Matthew R. Durose, Patrick A. Langan and Erica L. Smith, shows that in both 2002 and 2005, White, Black, and Hispanic drivers were stopped by police at similar rates. While the majority of stopped drivers (86.2%) felt police had a legitimate reason for stopping them, driver opinion was not consistent across racial/ethnic categories. White (87.6%) and Hispanic drivers (85.1%) were more likely than Black drivers (76.8%) to feel the stop was legitimate. Driver opinion also varied depending on the reason for the traffic stop. A smaller percentage of Black drivers stopped because of a vehicle defect (66.5%) felt they were stopped for a legitimate reason compared to White drivers pulled over for the same reason (90.5%). Opinions about the legitimacy of the traffic stop were relatively uniform among White, Black, and Hispanic drivers when the reason for the stop was a roadside check for drunk drivers, a seatbelt violation, or an illegal turn or lane change (Durose, M., Langan, P., Smith, E., 2007).

The same research showed that Blacks and Hispanics were more likely than Whites to be searched by police (Durose, et al). At the same time, more than half (57.6%) of all searches conducted were by consent. Consent searches occurred because either the officer asked permission to perform a search and the driver than granted it, or the driver told the officer he/she could conduct a search without the officer first asking for permission (Durose, et al, 2007).

There are also those who argue that, while racial profiling does exist, it may not always be a bad thing. The following is an overview of research done by Sean B. Trende and reported in the journal article “Why modest proposals offer the best solution for combating racial profiling”, taken from the Duke Law Journal (2000). Trende attempts to strike a middle ground between his unreserved condemnation of profiling and defending, basically, the indefensible. According to Trende, there is some argument in support of profiling and it may prove to be an effective anti-crime tool, however it runs against the grain of modern American ideals of fairness and equality. According to Trende, and as I personally experienced as mentioned before in this paper, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) uses a “drug courier” profile to assist in the prevention of drug smuggling, mainly at airports. There are several characteristics used by DEA agents that have been helpful in apprehending drug suspects, including: being the first off the plane, being the last to deplane, holding a one-way ticket, using a round trip ticket, paying for the ticket in cash, traveling alone and with a companion, and acting too nervous. Trende, states that profiling has proven successful by the number of large drug seizures made frequently as opposed to random stops. I participated in the use of this “profiling” at Palm Beach International Airport (PBIA) in 1986. My partner and I were at the airport to pick up a suspect; however the suspect never showed so we decided to spend a few minutes profiling potential traffickers that may be present at PBIA. After only a few minutes, we saw a Black female and Black male in line to purchase a one-way ticket to Atlanta. We noted that the plane was already in the process of being boarded and was due to leave within several minutes. We also noted that the female did not have any checked baggage and had only one carry-on bag. We further noted that she paid for the ticket in cash. All of her actions, as well as her race, were consistent with the DEA drug courier profile. What really “sealed the deal” in our minds was when her male companion said only “see you next time” as he parted ways with the female. At that point we approached the female and identified ourselves. We asked her if she would mind answering questions, being careful to explain to her that she was not being detained. After examining her ticket, we asked her if she could provide us with a driver’s license or any other form of identification (ID) to confirm that the name on the ticket matched her identification. She stated that she did not have any ID with her, unlikely for someone boarding an aircraft, even in 1986. She advised that she had been in town for several days visiting “friends” whose names, addresses and phone numbers she could not recall. Further, she could not explain why she had no luggage that would be consistent with someone visiting for several days. At that point, we requested her permission to search her carry-on bag. She refused, saying that she needed to board her plane. We told her that we were detaining her bag but that she was free to leave. After obtaining a search warrant, we discovered that the bag contained 3 kilograms of cocaine. We later learned that the female never boarded the flight to Atlanta. Technically, we had just used “racially profiling” on the Black female. In this case, the racial profiling led to the seizure of a sizable amount of cocaine. Was it improper to racially profile this suspect?As a 22 year police officer, the courts have always given the police discretion when applying police procedures. A recent article in the Palm Beach Post, May 4, 2007 in which County Court Judge Barry Cohen questioned whether members of the Palm Beach County Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF) making a minor marijuana arrest, based upon a early morning traffic stop for a tag light violation of a black male, was appropriate to combat recent gang violence in palm Beach County, shows that not everyone agrees with the discretion used. Cohen questioned whether the drug war has led to an increasing perception among blacks that they can be stopped in their vehicles for merely “driving while black”. Cohen’s comments raised concerns among me and members of the VCTF and the “Gangbusters” tactical component who made the stop and issued the subject a notice to appear in court on the minor drug violation along with a traffic citation for the tag light defect. The Palm Beach County State Attorney, Barry Krischer issued a rebuttal to Cohen’s decision supporting the role of police in using whatever lawful means available to fight gang violence and the war on drugs. Traffic stops is one tool that members of “Gangbusters” use on a daily basis to make further inquiry into a vehicle and receive verbal consent from occupants to look for drugs and weapons. To date, 1200 arrests have been made, almost 100 illegal firearms have been confiscated and gang related shootings and murders have dropped off significantly. The reason I include this commentary in this paper is to illustrate that, in my opinion, the courts will continue to balance the authority of police and the right of civilians to feel safe and secure when they move about in public.

Trende argues that if racial profiling was determined to be illegal, then police would have oneless tool to effectively fight crime. Los Angeles Police Department Chief Bernard Parks, himself Black, supports profiling but states that police are more interested in identifying criminal behavior than profiling but adds that it is not the fault of police when they stop minority males or put them in jail.

Trende provides discussion from scholars who agree and disagree with racial profiling but agree on the fact that profiling is effective in fighting crime. He posits that if liberals are wrong in refusing to weigh the costs of ending racial profiling then conservatives are wrong for ignoring the costs of allowing profiling to continue.

I think that is nearly impossible to make an accurate assessment at this time as to how widespread the problem of racial profiling. As noted above, there are conflicting studies showing both the presence and the absence of racial profiling. It is hard to even get scholars to agree as to what improper racial profiling is. After conducting this research, I think that there is little doubt that some forms of racial profiling do, in fact, occur at some law enforcement agencies. However, in order to determine the prevalence of this profiling, much more research must be done.

I would next like to discuss the ethics of racial profiling. In my opinion, there is no ethical dilemma for those police officers that practice what Arrow described as statistical discrimination. Those officers are not prejudiced and use a subject’s race merely as an indicator of the likelihood of criminality among those they stop. They base their stops, not on a personal dislike of any particular race or ethnicity, but rather on statistics that show that a particular race is more likely than another race to be involved in criminality under a given set of circumstances. The challenge, as I see it, is being able to identify those officers that participate in statistical discrimination for the purpose of fighting crime, and those officers that discriminate based on their own personal bias towards minorities.

Dr. Lee Brown, a former chief executive of several major police agencies, believes that ferreting out those officers that improperly discriminate begins with a clear message from the top of the police organization. According to Brown, “The leadership of a police organization ultimately will determine the character of the organization. Line officers must know and understand the core values of their organizations. These values must become the guide for police officer’s so they can judge right from wrong and acceptable from unacceptable behavior. They must understand that their mission is to protect the constitutional rights of each citizen, regardless of race, creed, color, sexual preference, or gender” (Brown, L., 1997). Police Chief Edward Flynn notes that “The police profession attracts individuals who are seeking moral clarity and who have a strong desire to correct the wrongs of society.” He believes that it is the responsibility of police executives to take advantage of this situation and “…create an environment in which young, morally strong officers can actualize their idealism” (Flynn, E., 1997).

The next level of the police department that needs to be addressed is middle managers, the sergeants and lieutenants that have contact with individual officers on a day-to-day basis. According to Police Chief Elizabeth Watson, “A major problem with police integrity is middle managers who do not understand or are unwilling to embrace the moral goals of the police department.” She goes on to say that “Supervisors need to be taught what it means to make core values part of the department’s operations and how to translate those values to apply them to judgments of subordinates’ behavior. Unfortunately, said Chief Watson, there are still those supervisors who see no conflict in acting on their own personal values, imbedded with prejudices and biases, rather than responding on the basis of the department’s core values” (Watson, E., 1997).

While providing an atmosphere and culture of unquestionable ethics and professionalism, a police department must, at the same time, hold individual officers accountable for acts of improper racial profiling. In my opinion, once it has been established that an officer has breached the police code of ethics, whether by improperly racially profiling or any other identified ethical breach, that officer must be made an example of. His or her punishment must be swift and certain.

In summery, it is my belief, based on my research and personal experiences, that improper racial profiling does exist in some police agencies. However, without more research being done, it is impossible to know for sure just how widespread that profiling is. When improper profiling is exposed, it may be a symptom of a breakdown in the communication of the department’s values and ethics between the department’s leadership and the line officer. That type of breakdown cannot be allowed to exist and must be addressed at all levels within the department.

References: Arrow, K., (1973). The theory of discrimination. In Ashenfelder, O. and Rees, A., eds., Discrimination in labor markets, pp.3-33. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ayres, I., (2001). Pervasive prejudice? Unconventional evidence of race and gender discrimination. University of Chicago Press.

Brown, L. Dr., (1997) Police Integrity, Public Service with Honor: A Project for the United States Department of Justice. P. 26. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Bush, George W. Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on administration goals. Washington, DC. February 27, 2001.

Durose, M., (2007). Contacts between Police and the Public, 2005. United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Flynn, E., (1997). Police Integrity, Public Service with Honor: A Project for the United States Department of Justice. P. 27. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Flynn, K., “State cites racial inequality in New York Police searches,” New York Times, December 1, 1999, at 22.

International Association of Chiefs of Police. (2006). Addressing racial profiling: Creating a comprehensive commitment to bias-free policing. Washington, DC: Author.

Lamberth, John., Driving while Black: A Statistician proves that prejudice still rules the road,” Washington Post, August 16, 1999, at C1.

Lange, J., Johnson, M., Voas, R., (2005). Testing the racial profiling hypothesis for seemingly disparate traffic stops on the New Jersey Turnpike. Justice Quarterly, 22, 193-221.

Leach, Russ. International Association of Chiefs of Police. (2006). Addressing racial profiling: Creating a comprehensive commitment to bias-free policing. Washington, DC: Author.

Ludwig, Jack. Americans see racial profiling as widespread. May 13, 2003. The Gallup Poll. Retrieved on May 29, 2007 from http:// www.poll.gallup.com.

New York Attorney General, New York City Police “Stop and Frisk” Practices: A report to the people of New York from the Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY: December 1, 1999, at 95.

Ramirez, D., McDevitt, J., Farrell, A., United States Department of Justice (2000) A resource guide on racial profiling data collection systems, promising practices and lessons learned. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

State of New Jersey v. Pedro Soto et al., Superior Court of New Jersey, 734 A.2d 350, 1996.

Trende, S., (2000). Why modest proposals offer the best solution for combating racial profiling. Duke Law Journal, 50, 1 – 29.

Verniero, P., Zoubek, P., New Jersey Attorney General’s Interim Report of the State Police Review Team Regarding Allegations of Racial Profiling (N.J. Interim report), April 20, 1999.

Watson, E. M., (1997). Police Integrity, Public Service with Honor: A Project for the United States Department of Justice. P. 29. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, Civil Action No. CCB-93-483, Maryland Federal District Court (1993).