Nice Essay

Introduction

In spite of the confusing nature of NGOs, the theorists who study them seem to be inclined to assess this exacting form of political practice in terms of democratic theory. They try to establish how much NGOs contribute to participatory democracy. There seem to be a more or less equal numbers of enthusiasts and sceptics. In the mid-nineties some were quite excited. But since then the contradictions which are unmistakably clear in the practice of NGOs have led most authors to adopt a position that is midway between the extremes. A number of practical studies have now been carried out on the work of NGOs, their success and failure, the results of their actions and their political significance. Some authors approach NGOs from an entirely different angle. They go past these issues or even turn the questions around, so that the key question becomes: What does the NGO phenomenon mean for our understanding of the state, government and democracy? The key concepts are those of the state, democracy and civil society. But before we approach this subject more closely it would be wise to look at some recent studies in this field.

The equivocal nature of NGOs

In the beginning many people waited with great expectation to see what would become of NGOs. They thought that NGOs would form a new stage in the development of social movements. And they expected NGOs to follow the labour movement and the new social movements as a form of citizen participation. NGOs were also expected to represent the interests of consumers and the environment at the global level. All these expectations were realistic to some extent, e.g. in so far as some NGOs and their members came from within new social movements. But, when looked at objectively and in social terms, this is true of very few NGOs. The new social movements covered a wide spectrum of political and, above all, social issues: environment, energy policy, transport, peace, gender relations. Socialist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist goals were associated with the first great wave of protest in the late sixties and early seventies. But these goals were relegated to the sidelines in the second wave of protest in the late seventies and early eighties. The global environment and support for liberation movements in the countries of the South were significant issues for only a small proportion of activists, political organisations, publishers, journals and alternative enterprises engaged in fair trade.

NGOs have developed in a similar way to green parties. In the case of the latter, political activists have turned professional by engaging in party politics and going into parliament. In a small sector of the social movements, especially in the environmental field, movement activists have turned professional by founding NGOs. These two political strands became tied together towards the end of the eighties and at the beginning of the nineties as a result of the debate about sustainable development and by the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. In these two fields (environment and international solidarity), unlike in others, NGOs succeeded in gaining recognition from intergovernmental organisations and national governments. Individual organs of state and some foundations gave direct financial support to NGOs and/or supported them indirectly by means of tax exemptions and cooption in political discussion processes. The active involvement of NGOs and the recognition of them by the state won them respect and public support, so that they could depend on a substantial level of donations from the public. A few well-organised NGOs have broad-based networks and often operate internationally. These include only a few older organisations such as Amnesty International and rather more organisations like Greenpeace. The images and expectations that people have of NGOs are based on these organisations.

Only a very small proportion of the NGOs that now exist around the globe can take part in international conferences and try to influence the decision-making process. They represent particular interests and groups of people without having been elected and mandated by them. The participation of a particular NGO in conferences is most often made possible by close contact with governments, a particular state or individual politicians, i.e. personal acquaintance or membership of a particular network. The” sovereign people” often do not know that they are being represented. This gives rise to the well known paradox of representation: that the representative is appointed first and then defines those whom he/she represents. It may well be the case that NGOs act in the best interests of the people whom they represent, but it may also be the case that they usurp their position and make people’s decisions for them. People who are affected by decisions have to accept that decisions will be made” in their name”. People who are supposedly represented by NGOs cannot effectively object to the activities of those NGOs - even when they know that the NGOs are representing interests that have nothing to do with the people affected by a particular decision. This is because the representative concerned can always claim to be speaking on behalf of some other individuals, groups or interests. In this way, it is possible for whole tracts of land to be turned into nature museums against the will of the population, whilst elsewhere the process of urbanisation goes on uninhibited. NGOs might force people to adopt a particular idea of sustainable consumption. Alternatively, they might claim to follow a policy of sustainability whilst at the same time being involved in the marketing of particular resources and discrediting people who object as particularistic. In addition, in the end it is this paradox of representation that enables the state to assert its own legitimacy over and above that of NGOs as the real representative of the interests of the people. This is even easier for the state when it points out that all interest groups are able to take part in the political process.

Finally, we can point to yet another aspect of the problem that can be observed during international negotiations. Northern NGOs tend to come into conflict with each other over negotiating strategies. If they make radical demands, they run the risk of being ignored by political or economic decision-makers. If they are too cooperative, this may create the impression that they are too weak, lack power in negotiations or have spoilt their chances, because many activists feel that they are no longer represented. Research has confirmed the hypothesis that in the limited field in which NGOs have the ear of international institutions, intergovernmental bodies and governments or are contracted to undertake particular projects; these NGOs may be used in various ways to supplement the activities of the state. NGOs possess specialised, scientific or local knowledge. They belong to broad networks and have many contacts. They are trusted and respected by people at the grassroots. They often have more scope for effective action than corrupt state bureaucracies. And they can perform work relatively cheaply, which would be far more costly if undertaken by state institutions or which state institutions are barely in a position to undertake because they lack the relevant powers.

(Demirovic 2000).

There is a significant difference between the NGOs in the countries of the South and those in the North. NGOs based in Japan, the USA or Europe have access to information, money, technology and political contacts. They share the same cultural and political background as the official decision-makers (Wahl 1997). This gives rise to an imbalance that has many disadvantages. Amongst NGOs in the North, there are often paternalistic attitudes towards the South. NGO representatives from the South find themselves in a dependent role, with the fatal consequence that they are either constantly complaining about the lack of solidarity from the North and therefore make themselves unpopular or they allow themselves to be co-opted and lose touch with their own political and social grassroots. In the latter case, they become divorced from their local context and simply act as mediators between local groups and NGOs in the South and the donor institutions in the countries of the North. Working for an NGO becomes a well-paid job, which no longer bears much relationship to the original reason for becoming active or to the real situation of the country concerned. Moreover, such jobs have to be made permanent in the interests of the members of the NGO. NGOs appear alongside state institutions and take on the tasks of the state. They have to compete for financial resources and for contracts for project implementation. The NGOs of the North, in order to safeguard their own standing as advocates, avoid being too critical of their own societies, although this is where they should be bringing about fundamental change in order to solve the key problems of the South. In order to justify their continued existence, they have to maintain the image of the South as being in need of support.

The picture of NGOs, which is portrayed in the media and some academic literature, is characterised by a very selective treatment of issues, organisations and projects. Several factors enable Greenpeace to gain attention: Dramatic actions, negotiating skill and expertise, international presence and forward-looking technological developments (e.g. CFC-free refrigerators) have all helped Greenpeace to win widespread public confidence. On the other hand, there are tens of thousands of NGOs spread throughout many regions of the world which are concerned with a wide variety of issues and vary considerably as regards political orientation, but they are almost totally ignored. Given the great diversity of NGOs, one might ask whether there is any sense in trying to analyse this phenomenon in general terms. It seems to me that this is only possible, if NGOs are regarded as a particular kind of political body - like political parties (Jäger 1983, Hirsch 1999), i.e. as a social entity that is formed in a particular conflict of social actors and then in turn strongly influences or even determines their behaviour.

The subject matter that we have addressed here from the point of view of democracy theory can also be addressed with similar results from the point of view of state theory. As far as many grassroots groups or groups within a movement are concerned, it does not make any difference to them whether or not they are regarded as NGOs. In the seventies many of them would have been regarded as being part of social movements. When they take on the form of an NGO, they have a different significance within society and are no longer movement organisations (Klein 1997). They are recognised by the state and are given official status. They are given tax privileges. They can apply for grants or win contracts. They have formal access to the government, parliamentary bodies, national and international organisations and decision-making bodies and can develop informal contacts with individuals in the state administration and in political parties or foundations which have an influence on the political process.

It is this development in particular which leads us to regard NGOs as democratic actors in a pluralist neo-corporatist context. This goes against the conventional narrow definition of democracy as the political process whereby the electorate chooses between competing parties on the basis of their programmes and candidates. From this point of view, neo-corporatist tripartite negotiations between government, trade unions and companies are a challenge to the government’s decision-making powers and can therefore be regarded as a weakening of democracy. Similarly, social movements may be dismissed as a form of mob rule or as an irrational expression of the special interests of a small minority. If we take this analysis to its logical conclusion, NGOs are not to be regarded as democratic actors, because they are suspected of weakening the authority of the state and the state’s monopoly of power both in terms of making decisions which are collectively binding and in terms of physical force.

It is not least the pressure of social movements and their demands for greater democratic participation which have led to a change in the official and constitutional definition of democracy and in the understanding of democracy from the point of view of political scientists and journalists. As a consequence, not only associations such as trade unions but also social movements and NGOs are valued as actors in the democratic process. A distinction is made between four forms of advocacy and participation in decision-making:

a) Administrative: interaction between representatives of the state administration and interest groups in the drafting of legislation, the implementation of government policy, the awarding of public contracts and the monitoring of social problems;

b) Territorial: the prerogative of political parties;

c) Functional: carried out by associations of workers, employers, craftspeople, doctors, farmers, teachers, etc.;

d) Experts, citizens’ initiatives, lobbyists: These form a large new category of actors in the field of advocacy which is regarded as a part of civil society. In this whole realm between the private sphere and the state a multitude of organisations and associations promote interests which are not their own private interests but rather have to do with public affairs. Actions are intended to have an impact in public life. Fairness and abstention from violence are key aspects of the normative self-understanding of the many diverse, competing actors within civil society. They are characterised by the use of public argument, whereas the administrative and functional forms of advocacy are characterised mainly by negotiation (Klein 1997). Where negotiations are concerned, the actors have a certain amount of power: They can threaten to boycott negotiations or to leave the negotiating table and thus render the actions of the state less effective. Where the use of argument and persuasion is required, the actors have to accept the consequences of being bound by their own arguments, if their arguments are to carry weight (Saretzki 1995). Habermas distinguishes between influence and power. The actors within civil society can win public support for their arguments and bully the political system which consists of bureaucracy, parliament and government. But they have no direct power to determine the decisions which are made (Habermas 1992).

This observation, that civil society does not wield any power but can exert influence through public argument, implies a questionable value judgement. It is implied that - because their actions are backed by logical argument - organisations of civil society, in our case NGOs, are internally democratic and do not pursue the vested interests of a particular group - unlike trade unions, which promote the interests of particular groups and are judged to be hierarchical and bureaucratic. As we have already shown, neither of these assumptions is true. NGOs are not necessarily democratically organised and do indeed often pursue the special interests of particular groups. This supposed contrast between NGOs and trade unions is also unsatisfactory from a normative point of view. When NGOs engage in advocacy on behalf of rainforest or indigenous peoples, this is not in any way morally superior to the demands of trade unions for jobs for the millions of unemployed, the payment of sickness benefit, educational opportunities or training subsidies. The question is also raised as to whether the interests of particular groups do not actually have a relatively high normative value. The widespread rhetoric of public welfare can be used, on the other hand, to justify massive job losses on the basis of a policy of sustainable employment or to reject refugees as simply “economic” refugees. A normative preference for argument rather than negotiation logically leads to a policy of giving preference to NGOs over and above trade unions and other associations. People tend to forget that trade unions have NGO status on the international stage. And NGOs are often active where trade unions have been seriously weakened by government policy or the power of large companies.

NGOs can be regarded as a phenomenon which indicates that associations and political parties are in crisis. The function of associations and political parties as decision-making or representative bodies is in any case minimal as a result of low levels of participation in elections. And in the leading capitalist states they have fallen into disrepute (Hirsch 1999). Finally, NGOs can operate where the state apparatus is in crisis and the functions of the state are taken over by society. In this case, NGOs are not intermediary bodies, because there is no state or government to relate to. The judicial model of the relationship between the state and NGOs is problematic because it is constructed on the assumption that civil society is always focused on the national government as the centre of political decision-making (Demirovic 2000). In reality, the networking and coordination of NGOs at the international level cannot be overlooked. Given a neo-pluralist concept of civil society, this is interpreted as the mobilisation of international public opinion and as a contribution to the democratisation of global society. But this does not fit the concept of NGOs as advocates and intermediaries between private interests and the state. This contradiction can only be overcome by regarding international civil society simply as an extension of this form of advocacy into every nation state throughout the world (Habermas 1992). It is significant that many NGOs participate in international and transnational political processes, political processes which themselves become arenas of conflict, not least because of the participation of NGOs. NGOs have therefore played an innovative role in the development of a new form of political action.

There are at least three lines of argument which indicate that the model of civil society as a form of intermediary is too simple. Firstly, the implicit assumption that civil society is oriented towards the nation state as a stable focus for political activity is unrealistic. It implies that the opinions of a great many individuals, when they are expressed in public debate, are all directed towards the top of the socio-political pyramid. There are, however, debates on a horizontal level around particular subjects, organisations, policies or broader issues. And the processes of civil society do not only operate from the bottom upwards as if it were only a forum in which social movements represent group interests and organise protest. Civil society also provides a forum in which state actors can maintain the status quo or rather manage the way in which the status quo is allowed to change. There is a general disregard of the fact that civil society - taken as a whole - is a unity of opposites which includes two kinds of actors: those which exert the power of the state and those which are opposed to state hegemony and which advocate alternatives to the conventional capitalist model of the regulation and reproduction of society.

Secondly, no account is taken of the internal logic of civil society. It is reduced to a purely political phenomenon. The cultural - and in a formal sense private - aspects of civil society are disregarded. Music societies, art galleries, learned societies, churches, pubs, cafés, clubs, street names, publishers, intellectuals: These are all part of civil society. Civil society is the space in which social and political consensus is built. Political activities are of secondary importance in the midst of such a wide variety of cultural activities.

Thirdly, the state is neither a unitary entity nor the top of a pyramid. A centralist judicial model of political power which sees the state as a hierarchy does not fit the facts. And it clearly has no validity when one takes into account the transformation of the state which is taking place through denationalisation, privatisation, internationalisation of the state, and adaptation of the machinery of government for the purpose of global governance instead of government of the nation state (Jessop 1999; Hirsch 1999). The state is, as we shall see, a force field of strategic forces, in which NGOs are present as one kind of actor. NGOs not only extend the field to include additional interests. They also contribute to the transformation of the state. It is therefore not possible to separate state and society. NGOs turn the state into part of society in such a way that they internalise - or reproduce within themselves - the separation of civil society and the state. The problem with many theories of civil society is that - on the basis of certain normative assumptions - they advocate a formal separation of judicial state power from civil society, so that they become blind to the crisis of the state and the tendency of politics to become a socio-cultural phenomenon.

NGOs and the Globalisation of the state

According to the concept - developed by Poulantzas - of the capitalist state as a social structure, the bourgeois state does not stand over and above society. We have to change our concept of government by the state accordingly. In the first place the state influences structures, establishes the equality of all persons before the law as citizens and unites the people as a nation which it then represents. As the state transforms class conflict into a multitude of conflicts between particular social interests, it condenses these conflicts within its own apparatus. This process of condensation in turn constitutes the state. The conflicts amongst the ruling classes and between the ruling classes and subordinate classes take on a political form and are fought out within the state apparatus. All the parties to a conflict, whether it is between the employer and the employees within a firm or between a company and the local population, have an interest in pursuing the conflict within the state apparatus. The employers favour this, because they are otherwise too weak on their own. The workers prefer it, because any success that they might have in a conflict with their employer is immediately threatened by competition from other workers or by the strength of other companies somewhere else. The state becomes the terrain on which groups within society sort out their differences. So long as the separation of the state and the economy is reproduced in such conflicts, the ruling classes will always have the upper hand, because the state is the structure within which they coordinate and combine their common interests.

In order to extrapolate Poulantzas’ ideas to shed light on NGOs, we have to take his thought further in two directions. Firstly, we have to make clear from the start that the concept of the state as a material condensation of the relationship of power within society is not to be restricted to the nation state. In the seventies Poulantzas already argued, quite rightly, against the view that the internationalisation of capital would inevitably lead to a supranationalisation of the state. This view is still widespread today, though, because of globalisation. Poulantzas criticizes in particular the apparent assumption that there is an in-built contradiction between economic structures and processes (the internationalisation of production, the dynamic nature of

the capitalist system of production) and an out-dated overall framework (the nation state) (Poulantzas 1975, p. 71). Poulantzas’ key argument is based on the assertion that the capitalist system of production does not control society from outside but rather reproduces itself within the social structures of society. These social structures form the space in which processes that are not concurrent sort themselves out and lead to a particular constellation of social forces and class struggles (Poulantzas 1975, p. 45). This reproduction of the capitalist system of production in and through social structures has historically taken on the form of an imperialist hierarchy in which individual centres have imposed their rule using their own various means of oppression and exploitation. Poulantzas perceived the actual existence of this imperialist hierarchy or chain of command at the beginning of the seventies in two dividing lines: firstly, a line between the metropolitan centres and the oppressed societies, and secondly, a line between the metropolitan centres themselves. According to Poulantzas’ interpretation, the economic relationship between the USA and Europe is reproduced in the form of dependency within European societies. This leads to the emergence of a new form of capital, the inner bourgeoisie, which is distinguished from the national bourgeoisie by the fact that it represents the interests of multinational companies. But, unlike the comprador bourgeoisie, it does not simply act as the executive arm of company headquarters, but rather adapts itself to the local (i.e. national) situation as regards production and wealth creation and therefore comes into conflict with head office. Since the metropolitan states reproduce the interests of ruling capital, it is clear that they are dependent.

In spite of the linking up of systems of production, the state still primarily takes on the form of the nation state, according to Poulantzas, because the class conflicts of national society are condensed within it (Cox 1998). The conclusion - so far as democracy theory is concerned - is obvious. The subordinate classes and groups are really only able to influence political decision-making processes and to force compromises within the framework of the nation state. The institutions which make democratic control and voluntary assent to binding agreements possible and which have only been established as a result of hard-won compromises, exist only within the nation state (Hirsch 1999, Jessop 1999). When political decision-making shifts into a supranational arena, one of the conclusions which we can draw is that we should fight for a return of policy-making to the national arena.

Nevertheless, the view that the bourgeois state can only exist in the form of the nation state does not seem to hold water. Over the course of history the bourgeois state has at times taken on the form of a multinational or colonial empire. Strictly speaking, it was not until the period of decolonisation after the Second World War that nation states became the norm, i.e. at a time when state management of the economy, democracy and territory all followed the same boundaries and American power and influence, especially over European countries and Japan, encouraged the development of a centralised, autonomous welfare state. We should tackle this question systematically using Poulantzas’ concepts, because this enables us to observe the development of an internationalised state as a constellation of social forces, in which NGOs play a significant part. If we define the state as a strategic force field and the material condensation of the relation of social forces, this does not mean that this material condensation can only take on a national form, already pre-defined. If that were the case, then the state would not also be reproduced as a form of government. But the state would nevertheless have power as a form of government, because it had been predetermined structurally that social forces and power can only become condensed in this particular form. The reason for this seems to be Poulantzas’ supposition that the state is always characterised by being constituted by a nation. But it is Poulantzas’ own dynamic and relational concept of the state which suggests that the state should be regarded as a strategic force field, as an extensive network of reproductive mechanisms, through which social power flows. From this point of view, the national dimensions of the state are important, but only as strategic elements of the state which may increase or decrease in importance depending on the economic situation and the constellation of political forces. In other words, there are many indications that, whilst nation states are far from becoming insignificant, let alone redundant, they are being reconstituted. This is happening in parallel with global, transnational profit maximisation and accumulation of capital. Linked with this is the formation of a transnational sub-class of the bourgeoisie and transnational categories of labour (both highly qualified and unqualified, both legal and illegal migrants) (Hirsch 1999). Existing balances of power become unstable as a result.

Nation states not only reproduce dependent relationships within themselves; they also become a part of the internationalised state - along with individual institutions and political processes. The internationalised state does not take the form of an independent autonomous institution. It is a reproductive system which is supported both by parts of the nation state and by international organisations, such as the UN and its agencies, NATO, OECD, WTO, the World Bank, the IMF and the EU, etc. The apparatus of the nation state and individual parts of it are linked up at various levels with supra-state institutions to form a network. And together with these supra-state institutions the apparatus of the nation state reproduces itself as state at a higher level. The way in which relations of power are materially condensed now differs, of course, from that during the era of the Keynesian welfare state.

In the seventies Poulantzas was able to observe that a political crisis and the crisis of the welfare state caused political decision-making processes to be transferred out of parliament and government into the administrative apparatus. This then became the organisational focus and the seat of political power and was politicised in the process. This led to a permeation of the administrative apparatus by diverse interests. Various factions secured a position within the apparatus. And numerous competing networks spread out over it. The shift of political power into informal channels and arcane political processes within the administration causes the masses to be excluded from the democratic process. Poulantzas calls this process “authoritarian statism”. It is not an extraordinary kind of state - as in the case of fascism or military dictatorship, but can instead be characterised as the “new ‘democratic’ form of the bourgeois republic” in the phase of transition from fordism to post-fordism (Poulantzas 1975, p.191). Poulantzas nevertheless remains too closely bound in his thinking to the model of a closed political administration and does not take account of the web of administration that is spreading itself out across the globe. “The growing horizontal differentiation of international institutions and hence of the national ministries, sections and units concerned indicates that civil servants are involved right across the board in dealing with international problems. Contact with colleagues in other states and with international organisations in order to share information and opinions has become an accepted part of the daily routine.” (Wessels 2000, p. 427.) Associations and NGOs are also involved in this business of cooperative management through an international network operating at several levels. This management process is not simply restricted to large international conferences. It also includes a multitude of daily interactions and routines of an administrative nature. With their knowledge and the political pressure which they exert, associations and NGOs contribute to the “increasing complexity of inter-state problem solving processes” (Wessels 2000, pp. 371.) But this cannot be described as a process of corporatist negotiation, because the NGOs do not speak on behalf of members who can be mobilised. And it is similarly impossible to make unambiguous agreements which are generally applicable and binding on governments and state administrations as well as corporate actors. On the whole it is just a question of information exchange and consultation. But even this is sufficient to alter the relationship between state and society, because the international organisations and administrative bodies become politicised as a result of maintaining contacts with journalists, political parties, interest groups and representatives of NGOs. The mechanisms of governance - consultation, agreement, participation - develop along the lines of a loose geometric system which links local, regional, national and supranational decision-makers with each other and with social groups according to how much power they have and the matters with which they are concerned.

In this situation NGOs exert a democratising influence in two ways: Firstly, they ensure the transparency of political processes, constellations of power, stalling tactics, ignorance and incompetence; Secondly, they work to improve decision-making processes. NGOs contribute step by step to the transformation of the political landscape and to the development of international networks of state administrations. In my view, neither democracy nor our concepts of democracy should be limited to national, regional and local levels, because this fails to take sufficient account of new patterns of reproduction of state power within a network of reconstituted administrative bodies. Some enthusiastic supporters of globalisation believe that we will eventually find ourselves living as world citizens in a global democracy. But this is not going to happen. What is already happening is that the strategy of the powerful states, which is to shift political processes into the arcane world of international organisations, administrative bodies and networks, is causing NGOs to be forced into the role of social interest groups. Whilst submitting to this process, NGOs can sometimes exert a democratising influence without necessarily being democratically constituted themselves. It is the new pattern of hegemony itself which creates these new possibilities for action by NGOs (Cox 1998, p. 80).

Poulantzas’ analysis follows Althusser’s break-down to a large extent. Althusser concerns himself with the many aspects of social life which he sees organised within the various parts of an ideological state apparatus. These organs of the ideological state, each with their own particular methods of subjugation, facilitate the allocation of individuals to various social structures and thus determine what functions they perform. But there is a key problem with this form of government. In political theory, following Weber, it is somewhat one-sidedly referred to as the problem of legitimacy. This term is inadequate, because”legitimacy” is associated with justice and morality and consequently with rational justification of the state. In addition, according to Weber the state exists as a bureaucratic institution. Round about the time when Weber was writing Gramsci invented the concept of civil society in order to draw attention to a more fundamental phenomenon. Within civil society a consensus is built which forms the basis for justification of rule by the state. People put their faith in legal regulations and moral standards which match their everyday beliefs, ideas and activities. This consensus is a one-sided imposition because it is created by the ruling classes imposing their way of life and their way of organising work on a great many other social groups. They demonstrate their ability to organise the production process and to manage the life of society and thus win trust and recognition for their good leadership. This form of hegemony succeeds in creating a commonly held worldview, in which the social contradictions are understood and dealt with as differences in interests. The way people look at things is transformed: Instead of multifarious opposing forces there is a more or less harmonious world which is only interpreted in different ways. It is within civil society that this transformation of social contradictions into unity with diversity takes place. Civil society, according to Gramsci, is an extension of the state which provides the leadership of the state with a firm and lasting basis in cultural traditions and customs. These traditions and customs are a form of rationalisation and a way of overcoming day-to-day economic ups and downs and short term interests on the level of moral and political goals. The state is reproduced in civil society as a coercive apparatus. Gramsci also refers to this as “political society” (società politica). (Gramsci 1971)

In Gramsci’s view civil society is made up of parties or factions, each of which tries to develop a collective purpose. Parties in this broad sense are organisations which determine the broad direction of politics, train the people who are to realise the goals and develop the image of these people. They also train the mass of the population and reconcile a multitude of particular interests through internal discussion. In Gramsci’s view, parties are “schools of state life” (Gramsci 1971, p. 921). As organisations within civil society parties are part of the extended state, which permeates a multifaceted society from schools and education to street names, publishing and newspapers, reorganises society into parties, forms collectives and thus reproduces the state. Seen from this point of view, NGOs - like the social movements of earlier years - are a result of the reform of the development of interest groups and collectives. They not only represent particular interests; they also contribute to their formation; they train people in a new political role; and they create a new relationship between the state in the narrow sense (government, parliament, administration) and the population.

Hegemony and civil society cannot be adequately defined simply in the context of the nation state and relations between states. In the course of the development of capitalism since the middle of the 19th century several forms of world order, each of them actually a form of hegemony, can be identified (Cox 1998, pp. 80). And globalisation is not based on direct subjugation and exploitation by a powerful state. It is much more a question of spheres of influence as forms of hegemony which are based on common interests.

In recent years a process has taken place in which hegemony has been established and parties (in the broad sense) have been created. Characteristic of this process is the existence of powerful international institutions, committees and think tanks which - although they don’t think of themselves as belonging to civil society - seek to promote the development of a civil society in which NGOs are to have a privileged role. It is not just a question as to whether or not there are NGOs which are politically active in international institutions. It is of considerable political significance that the activities of NGOs have been encouraged, taken up and developed by representatives of parties, governments and international institutions. This is intended to promote a strategy of reorganisation, a new pattern of reproduction of the national state apparatus and its integration into the international state. NGOs are seen as catalysts and building blocks in this process and are used accordingly.

In the first place, people are being trained within NGOs for a new political role in civil society as globalised intellectuals (Habermas 1992). With their particular skills and abilities these people can contribute to the development of a consensus in which the astronaut’s view, i.e. the spaceship earth model, supersedes all other views (Demirovic 2000).

And secondly, NGOs contribute to the construction of the internationalised state by helping to build up the internationalised imperialist state network. They also go beyond simply acting as consultants by supplying international decision-making processes with proper permanent channels for the forming of opinions. This is happening primarily in the politically”soft” areas of development, environment and human rights and to a lesser extent in the fields of security and economics. This is a warning to us to be careful in our observations, but it does not disprove our argument, because in these “soft” areas, as in the case of intellectual property rights, strategically important decisions are often being made in relation to new ways of accumulating wealth (Habermas 1992). And the process of extension and reproduction of the international state is by no means complete. Both these factors, the recruitment of intellectuals by NGOs and the development of new processes for the forming of opinions, are an indication of the dynamic nature of the self-transformation of the state, a process which is promoted by initiatives of civil society and taken up by political society. So far as NGOs are concerned, this means that there is a growth of political hegemony even within their sphere of action. Whilst some NGOs become privileged actors which have the ear of companies, international institutions and governments, others can try to build up public opinion and help to build social movements. The development of a new kind of NGO has therefore given rise to a new conflict within civil society in relation to the question of hegemony.

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