Nice Essay

Contents

DescriptionPage number

Title page1

Contents2

Personal Commentary3

Abstract4

Introduction: A brief outline of some of the main debates5-8

In the recovered/false memory debate.

The nature of forgetting an abuse memory: The concepts of 9-15

delayed recall and meta-awareness are covered

in this section.

Experimental evidence and the lab: Can studies based around 16-23

such methods be applicable to the to a therapy setting?

Several key experiments are described, with

emphasis placed on their applicability toward

a therapy setting.

Summery:Conclusions and further discussion of the debate23-26

References27-30

Personal commentary

When I first starting reading around the subject of recovered/false memories I started to gain a comprehensive view, or what I thought was a clear view of the debate at hand. Initially thinking that all recovered memories were false and that therapeutic community was full of poorly trained ‘professionals’ whose sole goal in life was to make money. How wrong could I be! After further reading I learnt that the debate is more complex than that which could ever be taught in a lecture course. Finally understanding some of the points involved I delved into the literature reading profusely for three or so months. Finally after several revisions I came up with two of what I believe main debates within the debate on recovered memories. I hope I have done it justice and sincerely hope you do to.

On a final note I would like to thank those who have helped me through this learning experience. I would like to thank my tutor Phil, whose laid-back approach and listening ear prevented some of the main stressors from this dissertation from becoming panic attacks. Special thanks goes to James Ost whose commentary and supply of articles was invaluable. Thanks as well to Jonathan Schooler of the University of Pittsburgh for his supply of invaluable articles. All in all this has been a good experience and one I hope build on. Enjoy!

Abstract.

This paper gives a general introduction into some of the key debates in psychology with the review two key debates concerning false/recovered memories of abuse. These are 1/ what processes other than repression can account for the forgetting of sexual abuse memories; and 2/ Can evidence for the creation of false memories in therapy be generalised to that setting.

1/ Case based analysis suggests that recovered memories have not been forgotten in a sense of repression. Instead it is argued recovered memories are perceived to have been forgotten due to a change in the individuals understanding of that memory. Enlightenment caused by this change therefore may be confused with a belief that the abuse memory has just been uncovered (Meta-awareness and discovery misattribution (Schooler, in press).

2/ Memory recovery techniques have been blamed for inducing false memories of abuse into the memories of those who have not been abuse. Several key experiments are reviewed, with the methods involved in each constructively criticised.

Conclusions and further debates are discussed with an emphasis on further cooperation between clinical and experimental psychologists to improve techniques used in therapy.

For over a decade now debate has surrounded the recovery of repressed or forgotten memories of childhood sexual abuse, with the emergence of what some believe to be a new syndrome called, ‘false memory syndrome’ (FMS). This involves the creation of an inaccurate or false memory of childhood sexual abuse, by an individual who has no history of such abuse. This paper will cover several of the key debates from this area. The first concerns the nature of the recovered memory and what processes are believed to contribute to the forgetting of a traumatic memory, as repression is an unsubstantiated theory what other processes may be involved in the forgetting of an abuse memory. The second concerns the debate as to the methods used by experimental psychologists to back up their claims that false memories can be implanted into an individuals, during therapy.

Introduction to the debate of recovered/false memories

” A horrible picture came into my mind but this time it did not go away…a whole reel of pictures started running through my head…I was terrified”

Extract form an interview with CV, an individual with recovered memories of sexual abuse, in Schooler (in press).

Individuals who recover memories of childhood sexual abuse find them to be very real, intense and disturbing. Having to come to terms with and re-evaluating ones own life history is a very long and traumatic process.

Recovery of an abuse memory can come about in a variety of settings, usually involving a specific cue to sexual abuse. These cues may emerge in therapy; a conversation; watching a film; reading a survivor self help book (such as The courage to heal; Bass and Davis, 1992); getting married; having children; or getting into a sexual relationship. Each case is different, with the amount of recovery varying form person to person. Initial recall of these memories is usually restricted and not always complete. Taking the form of flash backs, nightmares and strong emotional responses to cues (this is a non-exhaustive list), these may occur apart or together. Recovery techniques are used through therapy to help improve the cues associated with the repressed/forgotten memory, thus allowing better access to that memory by the individual. Thus allowing the individual to gain insight into the abuse memory and to cope with what has occurred in their past.

Why all the fuss concerning the recovery of memories?

As with any recall of a memory some inaccuracies are expected in the recalled memory. This is seen as more of a problem with recovered memories, as they have not been accessed for usually long periods of time (sometimes decades). Thus the memory may have deteriorated. This leads to further problems if suggestible techniques are used during further recovery, as a general bias toward the belief of a sexual abuse history by many therapists (Poole et al, 1995) may influence the reconstruction of the recovered memory. The source of any recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse is childhood. Childhood memories have also been shown to hold inaccuracies (Goodman, Quas, Faunce, Riddlesberg & Kuhn, 1994), as such recovered memories of abuse may have been inaccurate at the initial encoding stage, as well as at retrieval some years later and so increasing the ability of suggestive techniques to alter ones memories of an event.

Some clinical psychologists believe that much of the literature on false memory syndrome (Lindsay & Read, 1994; Hyman, Husband & Billings 1995; Loftus & Coan, reported in Loftus 1993) show misunderstandings as to why many therapists use memory recovery techniques. This does not, however, mean that such assumptions and conclusions gained by the experimental community are inaccurate.

The use of these memory recovery techniques to improve existing memories (recovered memories) or to recover memories of childhood sexual abuse is believed by many to be the main cause of false memories. These recovery techniques are thought to increase the suggestibility placed on a patient’s memory whilst in therapy (Lindsay & Read, 199?), thus causing the recall of a false memory. Growing evidence suggests that there is a phenomenon that resembles and may be deemed to be that of a false memory syndrome. This evidence comes from both retractors (those who believe that their recovered memories of abuse are false, Ost et al, in press), case analysis of recovered memories involving claims that are seemingly impossible (e.g. being ritually abused in satanic cults; Pendergrast, 1997). An example of which is discussed in Pendergrast (1997, p. 12-13), he reports the case of Michelle who recovered memories of satanic sexual abuse as a child whilst in therapy. Her memories involved being “held naked in a cage full of snakes” with her abusers at one point “surgically attaching horns to her head and a tail to her spine”. Although such things are not impossible her claims fall apart when examined more closely using medical records and interviewing other siblings. With the bulk of evidence used by those who advocate the existence of a false memory syndrome coming from experimental work into influences on memory. The nature of such work concerns primarily the effect of suggestion on memory, in particular that which may be present in a therapeutic context (e.g. Hyman, Husband & Billings 1995; Loftus & Coan, reported in Loftus 1993). Experimental evidence suggests that the use of memory recovery techniques during therapy may influence the content of any memory that is recovered during that period. Such evidence has been used to suggest that entirely fictitious memories (false memories) of being sexually abused in childhood may be recovered as a result of therapy (Lindsay & Read, 199?). Clinical psychologist on the other hand refute such claims, arguing that the methods used by experimental psychologists to gain insight into the effects on memory in therapy can not be generalised to the therapeutic setting. Thus any conclusions gained from the use of these methods are not accurate (Pezdek & Roe, 1994).

I will now look at the nature of forgetting a traumatic memory of childhood sexual abuse. Showing that there are other reasons other than that of repression that can accommodate for such forgetting. I will then move on to look at some of the main evidence for the occurrence of false memory syndrome and the concerns some have about its applicability to therapy.

Can memories of sexual abuse be ‘lost’ to the conscious mind as those who recovery memories and therapists claim?

Most memories of sexual abuse are not forgotten, indeed as Harvey & Herman (1994) state, “The most common characterization of an adult survivor is someone who has reached adulthood with some if not all memories of abuse intact”. Can traumatic memories therefore be forgotten? Summers and Pope (1994) conducted a survey of psychotherapists looking at their own experiences of being abused. Of those who returned the questionnaires 23.9% indicated that they had been abused: of which 40% reported a period of forgetting some if not all the abuse. Reports of recovered memories which have external evidence (see Schooler, 1994; Schooler, in press for examples) also show that traumatic memories of sexual abuse can be forgotten, as they would not have been recovered had they not been forgotten.

What processes, therefore, can cause the forgetting of a traumatic memory? This section looks three different accounts as to how forgetting of this nature may occur from a lack of specific recall cues (i.e. just forgetting, Schooler, 1994); delayed recall (Harvey & Herman, 1994) and the construction of a new understanding of old memories (Schooler, in press; Shobe & Schooler, in press).

What process or processes other than that of repression lead to the forgetting of childhood sexual abuse?

One of the main misconceptions surrounding recovered memories is that such memories have been repressed (Banks & Pezdek 1994; Schooler 1994; Schooler, in press; Shobe & Schooler, in press). Many in psychotherapy believe in the idea of repression. A recent survey by Andrews et al (1995 reported in Scotford, 1999) found that 97% of the sample (Psychotherapists) believed in repression. Those in the experimental community have attacked such a belief, pointing out that there is no direct evidence supporting the notion of repression (Loftus, 1993). Such blind faith in repression is challenged “by a century of research devoted to understanding memorial processes and the mechanisms which trigger forgetting” (Toglia, 1995).

If those in the experimental community are correct and repression is but an improvable theoretical concept, then there must be other reasons to account for such forgetting prior to the recovery of abuse memories.

Just Forgetting or Delayed recall

Some have argued (Schooler, 1994) that the forgetting of traumatic

experience is just that, forgetting. The forgetting of such memories could be an indicator that the correct retrieval cues have either not been encountered or not encoded, as such a cue dependent memory. At the time of encoding lack of rehearsal due to the individual not, ‘wanting to think about it’ would reduce the likelihood of any cues associated with the memory having a low saliency to the target memory, thus reducing the likelihood of retrieval. As such when the memory is to be accessed a general lack of such cues would result the failure to retrieve. In many cases the recovery of a traumatic memory is accompanied by very specific cues associated with sexual abuse, thus showing that the cue is triggering the actual abuse memory and not an association. The lack of prior knowledge of a recovered memory may indicate this. Because of the lack of cues associated with the abuse memory some time may pass before these cues are activated. Harvey and Herman (1994) argue for a multitude of reasons why an individual may forget his or hers abuse, including both amnesia and delayed recall. Concluding that the most common form of forgetting is that of delayed recall. Harvey and Herman (1994), argue that delayed recall “differs from that of normal forgetting not in the temporary absence of that memory form ones conscious but in the painful re-experiencing of the trauma when the memory is recovered” (Harvey & Herman, 1994). This would seem to fit most recovered memory cases. Another process, which may act at the same time as that of recall is, delayed understanding (Harvey & Herman, 1994; Schooler, In press). This occurs when the original memory of abuse is not thought of as abusive, but on later interpretation may be seen as abusive. What we have to realise is that at the time of encoding the abusive memory the individual is still a child, as such an understanding of what is occurring at the time may not be seen as abuse. Such a re-understanding of their abuse memory may lead some individuals to wrongly concluding that the memory was completely lost to them, were in fact it was just forgotten. This argument is explained in more depth in the next section.

Meta-awareness and discovery misattribution.

Recent research by Schooler (in press) has suggested other explanations for the perceived forgetting of abuse memories. Schooler (in press) highlights several possible reasons why one may not be able to access an abuse memory. His reasoning is based on two facets; these are the dissociation between experiential consciousness (being aware of what we are thinking) and meta-awareness (not being explicitly aware of what we are consciously thinking); as well as the concept of discovery misattribution.

Schooler (in press) describes a good example of meta-awareness in everyday life, that of daydreaming. When reading an important paper for example for course work. You suddenly realise that for the last few minutes, although reading the text you have not been attending to it. Instead you have been daydreaming about something completely different. As such you are consciously daydreaming but not conscious of the fact you were daydreaming (i.e. not meta-aware of the fact). This is usually accompanied by a sudden realization or “jolt of meta-awareness” of what you are doing, i.e. daydreaming. Retrospective analysis allows you to conclude that you were daydreaming. This example is one of the most common types of meta-awareness. Other more striking examples are those when we become aware of personally important events, such as that of a relative dying or of a trauma (e.g. being sexually abused in childhood). These sudden realisations force the individual to look at their emotional state and interpretations of such events (Schooler, in press). Such retrospective analysis does not always occur straight after the event. Recovery of a sexual abuse memory may be like this, with the memory of abuse being in the conscious mind, however awareness and understanding of the abuse memory not be. When one realises the memory is present one interprets the memory and because of its retrospective significance to the individual the view of the memory is changed. Schooler (in press) argues that if the newly acquired interpretation is profoundly different to that which was previously held, then the sense of discovery may be confused with a belief that the memory itself has been discovered. Where in fact the memory has always been accessible but the awareness and implications of that memory have either not been accessible, or has been profoundly different to the new interpretation. So the nature of forgetting a sexual abuse memory is such that the memory is not forgotten, but the interpretations and significance of the memory are. The notion of discovery misattribution adds to this concept and enhances its applicability to the forgetting of sexual abuse memories. Discovery misattribution is the idea that one may not remember prior recovery of a memory. Thus if the memory is seen as important and the individual can not remember any recall then the assumption would be that the memory had been forgotten. Misattribution can also occur when the memory is recovered, the initial surprise when recovering a traumatic memory may be interpreted by the individual as being that the memory had not been accessed before (Schooler, in press)

In short ” memory discoveries (recovery) result from an abrupt change in an individual’s meta-awareness of their abuse” (Schooler, in press). This may involve either the construction of a new meta-awareness or the accessing of an old forgotten meta-awareness associated with the abuse memory. The intensity of such a discovery of an old or new meta-awareness may lead individuals to wrongly conclude that the memory itself is being accessed for the first time, where in fact the individuals interpretation of that memory may have been either re-accessed, re-evaluated or developed for the first time (Schooler, in press).

If repression is not the main reason for the forgetting of traumatic memories, as many in psychotherapy believe, then the complexities of forgetting may be the alternative. Arguments put forward by Schooler (in press) seem to fit the current knowledge and case analysis of recovered memories more accurately than those put forward by Harvey and Herman (1994). Although not incorrect in their assumptions Harvey and Herman’s (1994) use of delayed recall does not account for cases such as that of TW, WB and DN (Schooler, in press), where the memories of their abuse have been recalled before. Schooler (in press) described each case; TW described her abuse to her mother whilst on holiday; WB confided in her boyfriend and DN actually took her case to court. Each of these individuals had recovery experiences, but each had shown that their memory was intact at several points in their lives, which they did not remember. Schooler (in press) points out that it is quite likely “that shifts in individuals’ meta-awareness of these experience over time may have fundamentally contributed to the discovery (recovery) experience”. Stating that in several of the examples shifts in understanding of the memory may have caused the recovery experience. The concept of re-evaluation of ones memories is commonly held to be true. As we develop through time so our beliefs and knowledge do to. If an individual recovers a memory of sexual abuse that has not been thought of in a long time, then their current beliefs will guide any interpretations and feeling associated with that memory. As Harvey and Herman (1994) point out when a memory is recovered the individual “rethink(s) the past, blending new memories into earlier ones, new assessments with alternative ones, gradually constructing a meaningful and largely verifiable personal history.”

So are recovered memories caused by repression? Without any experimental data to back up such claims mainstream psychology will no doubt always seem sceptical of such an argument. What can be said is that such memories are forgotten somehow, research along the lines of Schooler (in press) may hold the key to a wider acceptance of the processes that lead to the forgetting of traumatic memories.

Experimental evidence and the lab: Can studies based around such methods be applicable to the to a therapy setting?

Debate between experimental and clinical psychologists concerns the type of evidence used by each side to proliferate their argument (Shobe & Schooler, in press). Such is the difference in training between the experimental and clinical psychologists that several different data types are used. For those from an experimental background hypothesis testing is preferred with manipulation of variables to try and induce memory distortion (e.g. Roediger and McDermott 1995) or to create false memories (e.g. Hyman, Husband & Billings 1995; Loftus & Coan, described in Loftus 1993). Clinical psychologists and psychotherapists, on the other hand use primarily case analysis (examples of such methodology can be found in Harvey & Herman, 1994 and Schooler, in press), and personal experiences in the clinic (Pezdek & Roe, 1994) to back up their claims that recovered memories and the techniques used to recover them are valid. Experimentally based evidence has primarily been used to backup claims that false memories can be implanted into a patient/participant (Loftus and Coan, 1993, reported in Loftus, 1993; Hyman et al 1995). Evidence from those who have retracted claims of sexual abuse has also been used (Ost, Costall & Bull, in press), along with anecdotal reports of exaggerated claims resulting from recovered memories (see Pendergrast, 1997)

One of the main criticisms levied at the evidence for false memory syndrome is that there is not direct evidence showing that therapy can cause false memories (Pezdek & Roe, 1994). It may be the case that there is no evidence showing an individual gaining false memories of sexual in therapy, however, there is a lot of evidence that suggests techniques employed in the therapy situation can lead to the recovery of a false memory. Much of this particular work has been done with both the implantation of traumatic (Loftus & Coan; described in Loftus 1993) and normal childhood memories (Hyman et al, 1995).

Loftus (1993) described an experiment in which D. Coan and herself (1993) attempted to induce a false memory of being lost in a shopping mall as a child. Family members of the participants (mainly adolescents) were used to relay the false memory, “playing a game of ‘do you remember when…’” Loftus and Coan (1993; described in Loftus, 1993) found that the participants introduced the false memory into their own life narrative. Subsequent retrieval of the false memory resulted in the individual remembering associated thoughts and feelings. Pope (1996) argues that such findings may in fact be “…artefact…”(Pope, 1996), or created by the way the data was collected. Suggesting that both the participant’s parents and siblings may have forgotten that the ‘false’ event may have actually taken place. However Loftus (1993) asserts that the mother of one of the participants (Chris) could not remember such an event taking place. Pope (1996), Pezdek, Finger and Hodge (1996) reason, that being lost is a common childhood experience thus such a memory may either be true or an alteration of a common childhood occurrence (i.e. an existing script of such an event may be present). Arguing that similar scripts are not present for sexual abuse).

Pezdek et al (1996) attempted to introduce a memory without any pre-existing script. Using a similar ‘plausible’ false event of being lost in a shopping mall (i.e. one would possess a script for), and a traumatic non-plausible false memory event of having a rectal enema (i.e. one that a script would not be present for) into their participants. Pezdek et al (1996) found that participants where more likely to remember the plausible event, with none of the participants remembering the non-plausible traumatic event. This suggests that the results gained by Loftus and Coan (1993, reported in Loftus, 1993) do not really show anything relevant to so-called false memories of childhood sexual abuse. However there are counter criticisms to these claims, the first is that scripts for sexual abuse are readily available through the mass media, as well as survivor groups and literature. The courage to heal (Bass & Davis, 1992) is one of the more controversial sources of survivor literature and is reported to have aided the recovery of many abuse memories (or as some claim false memories, Pendergrast, 1997). The second being that Pezdek et al (1996) did not apply much pressure to their participants, which may be present either overtly or covertly in the therapy situation. Loftus and Coan (1993, reported in Loftus, 1993) reported a higher rate of recall than that of Pezdek et al (1996) of false memories, using larger amount of social pressure on their participants. Therefore claims that the Loftus and Coan (1993, reported in Loftus, 1993) experiment did not accurately represent the types of traumatic memories recovered in therapy are validated. However on closer inspection it can be seen how the methods used to critique the shopping mall study may fail to do so.

Another problem with the critique of this study is the common misquotation of Loftus and Coan (1993, reported in Loftus, 1993) claims that the false memory used in their experiment was “traumatic” (Pope, 1996). Stating that Loftus and Coan’s (1993, reported Loftus, 1993) generalisations of their findings to that of traumatic memories of abuse recovered in therapy are therefore inaccurate (Pope, 1996). Loftus (1993) in fact described the false memories used as being “mildly traumatic”, questioning whether a more traumatic memory could be implanted. However it would be unethical to attempt to create false memory of childhood sexual abuse. As such reports from those who retract their claims of sexual abuse seem to be the only direct evidence for a false memory syndrome. However, use of such individual’s testimonies is problematic, which will be discussed later on in this section.

Replications of the methods used by Loftus and Coan (1993, reported in Loftus, 1993) have attempted to introduce similar false memories. Hyman et al (1995) used college students in their study and found significant results showing that a false memory could be induced. Their procedure consisted of sending questionnaires to the participant’s parents to find actual occurrences in childhood, which the participants would possibly have memories of. In a subsequent interview with the participants these memories where relayed with one of a randomly chosen false memory. These where being naughty at a wedding; letting the handbrake off in their parent’s car and crashing it; and being in a store when the fire extinguishers went off even though there was no fire. After three interviews about all the memories used in the study, 25.5% of participants were found to have integrated the false event into their own life narrative. These results seemingly supported those findings of Loftus and Coan (reported in Loftus, 1993). However because the memories used in these studies are not seen as traumatic as those recovered in therapy it would be hard to totally relate such findings to the recovery of sexual abuse memories in therapy. What Hyman et al (1995) and Loftus and Coan (reported in Loftus, 1993) successfully demonstrated is that the use of repeated interviewing or retrieval techniques when looking for (or in this case inducing) a presumed memory in therapy may cause individuals to be persuaded of it’s authenticity, thus integrating it into their own memories over time. What was also demonstrated was how an individual elaborates on such an initial memory over time, introducing onto the memory his or her own personal feelings and actions they may have carried out during the false event. This therefore can be likened to a recovered memory gaining in saliency with repeated retrieval in therapy. Hyman et al (1995) stated that some of their participants used already existing memories (scripts) in the creation of the false memory, thus supporting this idea that the recovery of sexual abuse memories may involve using existing scripts at some level.

Criticism of the Hyman et al (1995) and Loftus and Coan’s (reported in Loftus 1993) studies also include the nature of the memories used in the experiments and the perceived location by the participants of where the memories came from. In both experiments the implanted memories came allegedly form family members, thus increasing the perceived reliability of the false memories. As such it could be argued that the memories that where implanted in the Hyman et al (1995) and Loftus and Coan (reported in Loftus 1993) studies where from a more influential authority on the participants background, Something that a therapist cannot claim to be. However, it can be argued that; 1) the family members in the studies represent a trusted source of information, that which the therapist brings to the therapy situation alternatively; 2) The source of the memory i.e. the family member is seen as someone who knows the life history of the participant, something that a therapist can not lay claim to. However, there is reason to believe that the “therapist does not stay in ignorant of what has occurred in their patients past” (Ost, personal communication, 9th January 2001). Pope (1996) suggests another problem, in that such results demonstrate the ability of family members to alter a relative’s memory of past events. This has connotations toward the idea of sources of influence in cases of retraction (see later).

Evidence from retractors: its implications for the false memory syndrome debate.

Another source of evidence for the existence of a false memory syndrome are cases of those who recover memories of abuse but have since retracted such claims, believing them to be false (’retractors’). Many psychotherapists would suggest such people are denying the abuse they have suffered. This may be true in some cases; however, some retractors have many siblings, which in many cases state they have not been sexually abused.

Such claims are what initially started the whole debate off, however have such vital resources been used? They have in terms of evidence from lawful decisions, in that a ruling that a practitioner has unlawfully induced a false memory due to malpractice from a court may bolster claims that a ‘false memories syndrome’ does exist. However such an important insight into the reasons why individuals would firstly make a claim and then subsequently retract their claims has bee over looked by many in psychology. According to Ost, et al (in press) such is the view of retractors (in psychology) that it is believed that “their experiences do not qualify as reliable evidence because retractors themselves may be highly suggestible or unreliable witnesses” (Ost, Costall & Bull, in press), this may indeed be the case. However some research has suggested this may not be the case, Ost et al (in press) looked at the reasons retractors gave for the retraction of their claims of sexual abuse. Research of this kind would allow an understanding of the processes involved for an individual’s conclusion that their recovered memory may indeed be false. Ost et al (in press) found their sample of retractors perceived more pressure to recover memories of sexual abuse (from therapists and peers) than they did to retract such claims (presumably from family and friends). If Pope’s (1996) arguments are correct then the use of family members in experiments to implant false memories (Loftus & Coan, 1993, reported in Loftus, 1993; Hyman et al, 1995) suggests that the same influence reported in these studies as showing retrieval of false memories presented by these family members, may influence those who recover memories of abuse to retract their. However such reasoning may be inaccurate in the majority of retractor cases. One of the main reasons being that when an individual recovers a memory of being sexually abused they usually sever all contact from the alleged perpetrator and all those who defend them, thus taking on the role of a ’survivor’ (an individual who has recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse; Pendergrast, 1997). This therefore would mean that any pressure from both their alleged perpetrator and others would be minimal. Results from the Ost et al (in press) support such an assumption. Other reasons for the retraction of child sexual abuse claims concerned the retractors perception of their recovered memory, 68.5% claimed that their recovered memory didn’t feel like a real memory. One participant reported not being able to recall their recovered memory separately from that of their memory of their therapy sessions. Others found “logical inconsistencies” with their memories, leading them along with other reasons to conclude that their recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse to be false memories.

This would therefore suggest that the recovered false memory is different from that of a ‘real’ recovered memory of abuse. However it would be difficult to show any discernable differences between perceptions of a ‘real’ recovered memory and that of a false memory. This would be due to differing perceptions of such memories from those who know their recovered memory is indeed false (retractors) and those who don’t (still believing it to be real). Ost (personal communication, 9th January 2001) recognises such problems, in that a study of this nature relies upon self-reports which are taken in from a retrospective viewpoint. As Ost states “we cannot use these findings to bolster our belief that their (individuals with recovered memories) abuse ‘memories’ either true or false…there is simply no reliable way of knowing” (Ost personal communiqué, 9th January 2001).

Summery

In conclusion, the concept held by many in psychotherapy (Andrews et al, 1995 reported in Scotford, 1999) that recovered memories are caused by repression’ cannot be refuted by the experimental community, however they can neither be supported. The idea that something isn’t true because there is no evidence for it is bad science. What has been shown in this paper is that there are alternative reasons for the forgetting of sexual abuse (Schooler, in press) and as such those who believe that recovered memories are not valid are incorrect in their analysis (Loftus, 1993). What does seem to be evident though, is that many experimental and clinical psychologists alike do not refute claims that some recovered memories of abuse are founded in reality (Scotford, 1999). What are of concern are those memories, which are recovered under highly suggestible situations, thus increasing the possibilities for the creation of a false memory. False memories have far reaching implications to for the individual; their family; friends and alleged perpetrator, as do real recovered memories of abuse.

The existence of ‘false memory syndrome’ is born out in the

experimental literature (Loftus & Coan, 1993, reported in Loftus, 1993; Hyman et al, 1995) and cases of retractors (Ost et al, in press) highlighted in this paper. Claims that lab based analysis is not generalisable to a therapy situation “seem to be this all to convenient” (Ost, personal communication, 9th January 2001). Lab based research does have it’s draw backs, the use of an artificial location and use of dissimilar traumatic memories to name but a few. These are mainly due to ethical problems preventing the use of false memories of abuse, and real life situations. To conclude that such research is not applicable to the therapy situation doesn’t do justice to the work and efforts of those involved. The ease at which some studies have shown false memories to be implanted shows that there may be a point where ones techniques of memory recovery may cross the line. Preconceptions by many in psychotherapy about sexual abuse, further proliferates the need for caution when using such techniques. Pezdek and Roe (1994) state that such techniques should only be used when the patients themselves have found an initial memory of abuse. However the presentation of an initial memory of abuse to a therapist may be unreliable it self, as false memories can arise without therapy at all (Scotford, 1999). All you have to do is look at some of the survivor literature such as The courage to heal (Bass & Davis, 1992) which are rife with suggestion, such as

“If you don’t remember your abuse you are not alone. Many women don’t have memories (of abuse)…this doesn’t mean they weren’t abused”.

(Bass & Davis, 1992, quoted in Pendergrast, 1997)

Such literature is indeed open to interpretation, one may surmise that the memory is so deeply repressed that such specific cues are needed to bring it into ones consciousness.

Unfortunately the therapist is caught in a ‘catch 22′, if on one side the experimental literature is to be believed then any form of memory work may lead the patient to recover false memories. However on the other side the patient needs to be helped to resolve lingering trauma. “Patients with genuine abuse memories have the right to expect proper treatment. Equally those with no abuse history have the right to scientifically based therapy that doesn’t lead to a false memory” (Scotford, 1999). Arguably psychotherapy as a profession needs to rethink certain key issues surrounding it’s practices and supportive evidence for such practices.

This applies to experimental research; a trend has developed for those in the profession to implicate their results with this current debate such as that done by Roediger and McDermott (1995) (For commentary on their arguments see Freyd & Gleaves, 1996), implicating miss-associations in word recall to the creation of false memories in therapy. Such nuisance research brings down the credibility of genuinely related research and the profession as a whole.

However, for the first time in the short history of this debate a ‘middle’ ground seem to be just over the horizon. Many are looking at the methodologies used with some from an experimental background using techniques such as case analysis to look directly at recovered memories of abuse (Schooler 1994; Schooler, in press), as well as at cases of false memories (Ost el al, in press). What does seem to be true is that this debate is far from over; a middle ground is still over the horizon. How far? We can’t tell. But what are supported are the concepts of false memories and genuine recovered memories of abuse. What those concerned with this debate must realise is that the prevention of child sexual abuse will be a long process, however, the prevention false memories of child sexual abuse

References

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Bass, E. & Davis, L. (1992). The courage to heal: A guide for women survivors of child sexual abuse (2nd Eds.). New York: Harper & Row.

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